Without the Right to Resist: Russia’s New Nuclear Doctrine Pressures Ukraine to Surrender

Oleksandr Demchenko, consultant at the CBA Initiatives Center

On November 19, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree approving a document titled “The Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence.” The decree outlines scenarios under which Russia might launch a nuclear strike, including cases of “aggression against the Russian Federation or its allies by any state supported by a nuclear power.” It also extends to large-scale non-nuclear attacks, such as those involving drones or cruise missiles.

When asked about the timing of this doctrine, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called it “timely,” sidestepping direct acknowledgment of its connection to recent U.S. approval for Ukraine’s use of ATACMS missiles deep within Russian territory.

We reviewed the document—hereafter referred to as “The Fundamentals”—and offer the following analysis:

Paragraph 3 of Part 1 of “The Fundamentals” states:

“The state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence is a set of coordinated measures—political, military, technical, diplomatic, economic, informational, and others—implemented with reliance on nuclear forces to prevent aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies.”

This section highlights that Russia’s nuclear strategy goes beyond traditional military measures, incorporating diplomatic and informational tools. By publishing this doctrine, Moscow appears to aim at pressuring Ukraine’s Western partners and other global players, including China, Turkey, and former Soviet states, to reconsider their support for Ukraine. The Kremlin is also signaling its willingness to escalate, using the threat of nuclear action as a tool of intimidation.

Notably, on the same day the doctrine was signed, Russian media reported that the Russian Research Institute for Civil Defense and Emergencies—a branch of the Ministry of Emergency Situations—had begun mass-producing mobile nuclear shelters. Could this be anything other than an “informational component” of nuclear deterrence?

Paragraph 3 of Part 1, Part 1 of the “Fundamentals” states:

“The state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence is of a defensive nature, aimed at maintaining the potential of nuclear forces at a level sufficient to ensure nuclear deterrence and guarantees the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, deterrence of a potential enemy from aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies, and, in the event of a military conflict—prevention of escalation of hostilities and their termination under conditions acceptable to the Russian Federation and/or its allies.”

While the language about sovereignty and territorial integrity may seem standard for any nation, the Russian Federation is signaling something more specific: its claim to occupied territories in Ukraine. Moscow’s definition of territorial integrity includes regions like Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk—territories not fully under Russian control but unilaterally declared as “its own” under its constitution. This interpretation gives Russia a pretext to invoke “nuclear deterrence” at any moment, actually foreclosing other paths to resolving the conflict.

The same logic applies to the phrase “preventing the escalation of hostilities.” In the context of war, what constitutes an escalation? Does it refer to strikes on military facilities in Russia, attacks on airfields used to launch bombers, or the destruction of Russian military convoys in occupied Ukraine? By framing escalation as a trigger for nuclear deterrence, the Kremlin retains broad discretion to justify its actions.

Paragraph 9 of Part 2 of “The Fundamentals” states:

“…nuclear deterrence shall also be exercised towards the states that provide territory, air, and/or sea space under their control for the preparation and realization of aggression against the Russian Federation.”

This clause can be interpreted in two ways. Under Putin’s publicly articulated logic, any country supporting Ukraine—whether by storing or transporting aid, training personnel, or facilitating logistics—could be viewed as a target for nuclear deterrence. On the other hand, Kremlin has consistently framed the conflict as a struggle against NATO and the United States, with Ukraine portrayed as a proxy. By this logic, Ukraine is the state that “provides controlled territory, air and/or sea space for the preparation and realization of aggression against the Russian Federation.”

Paragraph 11 of Part 2 of “The Fundamentals” states:

“Aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies by any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state shall be considered a joint attack.”

In Ukraine’s case, this clause is straightforward: the United States, the United Kingdom, and other nuclear powers supporting Ukraine, and Ukraine itself, are treated as parties to a “joint attack.” 

Subparagraph (b) of Paragraph 15 in Part 2 of “The Fundamentals” outlines threats that justify the use of “nuclear deterrence”:

“…the potential adversary’s possession and deployment of missile defense systems and means, medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, high-precision non-nuclear and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned systems of various bases, and directed energy weapons that can be used against the Russian Federation.”

Many of these weapons are already in Ukraine’s arsenal and actively used against Russian forces. Furthermore, Ukraine has been employing such systems for an extended period within territories occupied and annexed by Russia. In this sense, the conditions described in this provision have arguably already been “met.”

Subparagraph (e) of Paragraph 15 in Part 2 identifies another basis for nuclear deterrence:

“…the creation of new and expansion of existing military coalitions (blocs, alliances), which brings their military infrastructure closer to the borders of the Russian Federation.”

This clause underscores Russia’s longstanding opposition to Ukraine’s potential NATO membership and its broader strategy to pressure the alliance’s members.

Part 3 of “The Fundamentals” specifies the conditions under which Russia might resort to nuclear weapons. 

Beyond the direct use of nuclear weapons against Russia, these include:

“An attack on the Russian Federation and/or the Republic of Belarus with conventional weapons that create a critical threat to their sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

The phrasing regarding territorial integrity once again raises questions. Does the current situation in Ukraine, with strikes on Russian-controlled areas, meet this threshold? Based on Russia’s interpretation, it likely does.

“The receipt of reliable information about the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies.”

“The Fundamentals” do not clarify whether this refers exclusively to strategic ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Could such interpretation also be applied to tactical ballistic missiles like ATACMS with conventional warheads?

“…The receipt of reliable information about the mass launch (takeoff) of aerospace attack means (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aircraft) and their crossing of the state borders of the Russian Federation.”

This provision raises additional questions about what qualifies as “mass launch.” Would the simultaneous deployment of 50 or 100 Ukrainian drones suffice? Moreover, ambiguity surrounds the definition of “state borders.” Is this limited to Russia’s internationally recognized borders, or does it include areas Russia claims but does not fully control?

The above-mentioned weapons and tactics—ranging from drones to precision strikes on military infrastructure—form the backbone of Ukraine’s asymmetric strategy that includes targeting of Russian military infrastructure, military-industrial complex, armament depots. With the disparity in military strength, Ukraine cannot afford to abandon these methods. 

Conclusion

Under the new doctrine, Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s invasion—ranging from opposing the occupation of its southern and eastern regions to strikes on Russian military infrastructure (whether in occupied Crimea or deep within Russia’s borders)—as well as Ukraine’s political aspiration to join NATO, are already grounds for invoking the doctrine.

Furthermore, the decision to use nuclear weapons rests solely with Putin, who will determine when the “threat” to Russia’s sovereignty is significant enough to warrant a nuclear response. He will also decide when an attack involving UAVs or cruise missiles constitutes a “massive” strike. Or he may be advised to do so by members of his inner circle.

The Russian Federation’s only offer to prevent this scenario is for Ukraine to cease resistance and surrender. Under the threat of nuclear blackmail, Ukraine’s partners are expected to accept this demand.